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Abstract 
 This paper analyzes the effects of lagged changes in income inequality on credit growth 
and changes in housing prices. The theoretical model developed herein, borrowed heavily from 
Bengui and Phan (2016), predicts that growing income inequality should lead to credit growth 
and positive changes in housing prices. Using a panel dataset spanning 14 developed countries 
over 130 years, this model is tested empirically by applying first-difference ordinary least 
squares regressions with year and country fixed effects, as well as with lagged values for key 
predictive variables. The results indicate that income inequality is insignificant in predicting 
credit growth. However, lagged income inequality is significant in predicting changes in housing 
prices. Over the full sample, the fourth lag has a significantly positive coefficient. This result is 
robust through a battery of checks. The finding thus provides evidence for the hypothesis that 
growing inequality is associated with growing housing prices. 
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I. Introduction 
 2008, and the financial crisis that came with it, was a watershed year for economists in 
that it made clear the need to re-evaluate the current macroeconomic models concerning 
financial crises. Before then, movements in asset prices, especially booms and busts in housing 
prices, did not play a central role in most workhorse macro models, including most of the 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models employed by central banks. However, 
given the collapse of the housing bubble—which reached its peak in 2007 after several years of 
rampant speculation—and the subsequent deep recession, many now recognize that the activity 
in the financial sector can no longer be ignored from macroeconomic thinking. Indeed, Jorda et 
al. (2015) note, the seemingly unexpected nature of the 2008 global financial crisis was in fact 
due to the inability of current macroeconomic models to handle the rather prominent—and 
potentially dangerous—financial phenomenon, such as leveraged asset bubbles. This paper 
focuses on empirically documenting the empirical relationship between inequality, housing 
prices, and credit growth—specifically within the context of how the latter two contributed to the 
most recent financial crisis. 
 My results add to a quickly growing body of research which have sprung out of the Great 
Recession. Unsatisfied with the current models which failed to foresee the impending crisis, 
macroeconomists across the globe have become increasingly interested in developing models for 
what appears to several related trends: growing income inequality, risky asset bubbles, and 
increased leverage in the financial sector. Intuition, empirical data, and historical anecdotes—
such as rising income inequality before the Great Depression of the 1930's—suggest that 
somehow inequality and financial markets are intertwined. Kumhof et al. (2014) develop a fairly 
simple mechanism by which a permanent, positive income shock to top earners leads to an 
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increase in credit—that is, a credit boom. Similarly, Bengui and Phan (2016) develop a model in 
which increased earnings for top earners relative to bottom ones realizes increased asset prices. 
From these models and related stylized facts, several authors have further pursued empirical 
projects to evaluate the statistical relationship behind these key trends, as well as how they relate 
to economically-crippling financial crises. To that end, authors have tried to tie down various 
relationships, such as between crisis and credit growth, and credit growth and inequality. So far, 
the results are inconclusive. For instance, in Bordo and Meissner (2012), the authors find that 
growing inequality is insignificant in predicting either credit growth or financial crises, while in 
Kirschenmann et al. (2016), the authors find it is, at the very least, strongly correlated with the 
risk of financial crises. Meanwhile, in Jorda et al. (2015), the authors link housing bubbles to 
financial crises, and their results are made more robust when housing bubbles are concurrent 
with credit booms.  
 By exploring the three way relationship between inequality, credit, and housing prices 
more thoroughly and along different, unexplored dimensions, I submit this paper to the existing 
literature. Of specific contribution are my tests which account for additional lags of income 
inequality in predicting credit growth—which allows for a more thorough analysis of the 
relationship between changes in inequality and credit growth than what previous research has 
provided. Additionally, no other paper—at least to this author's knowledge—has tested the 
relationship between housing and income inequality, with more traditional macroeconomic 
factors used in such empirical tests. Given the housing bubble's role in many financial crises and 
its relationship with credit growth, this appears to be a sorely under-investigated relationship, 
which this paper hopes to remedy. All together, these two aspects of my research help paint a 
more panoramic view of the macroeconomy as it relates to credit, housing finance, and income 
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inequality, in which the relationships among all three and the nuances which qualify them can 
now be described more thoroughly.  
 As a roadmap for this paper, the next section discusses related literature. Sections III and 
IV outline my theoretical and empirical models, respectively. Section V discusses my dataset. 
Sections VI and VII first present and then discuss my findings, with implications for my model, 
and for further research.  
 
II. Review of Literature 
 The related literature around this topic is fairly extensive, but few clear cut answers have 
yet to emerge. Several authors, with the backing of historical and anecdotal evidence, have put 
together intricate yet pointed theoretical models which show associations between income 
inequality and credit growth and housing prices, respectively. Empirical analysis in the same 
vein suggest that there is some general relationship among these three variables—but to what 
extent and along what mechanism is not clear, as several authors find contradicting results. This 
empirical confusion has made it difficult to say in strong terms how, and to what extent, 
inequality impacts financial markets—a limitation this paper hopes to clear up. 
 Rajan, in his seminal book Fault Lines (2010), brings housing prices and credit together 
in a retelling of the events which led to the financial crisis of 2008. Using historical anecdotes 
from the United States, Rajan loosely describes a mechanism by which inequality leads to risky 
lending practices, housing and other asset bubbles, and ultimately a financial crisis. Due to the 
relative political popularity of providing housing credit over direct welfare, successive 
administrations instituted programs designed to increase home-ownership for poor people. In 
spite of the laudable intentions, this created an environment in which banks could lend to low-
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income people with some expectation or guarantee of government backing. Government 
regulators in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac prioritize the administrations' housing efforts over 
financial regulation, readily buying mortgage securities which were becoming increasingly 
comprised of subprime mortgages. This only fueled the subprime mortgage lending even more, 
as lenders turned the corresponding securities into a quick profit. The positive loop of credit 
allowed the bubble to continue to grow on itself until 2008, when housing prices finally reached 
their apex and financial crisis kicked off. 
 Since 2010, much work has been done to encode this relationship into a refined 
theoretical model. One such paper, Kumhof et al. (2016), develops a comprehensive theoretical 
model which internalizes what the authors observe to be related trends of rising income 
inequality, rising debt-to-income ratios, and rising risk of financial crisis. All together, their 
model specifies the mechanisms by which high household leverage and financial crises are a 
result to changes in the distribution of income, in particular its concentration among high income 
households. The key to their model is the assumption that top earners, when given a boost in 
their income relative the bottom earners, do not spend all of it on consumption. Rather, they 
devote a large share of the increase to further increasing their financial wealth in the form of 
lending to poor households. Hence, in building their model, Kumhof et al. assume that top 
earners directly factor consumption and financial wealth into their utility functions—the result 
being that permanent income boosts give top earners an incentive to loan to the poor. The 
authors further assume that seek to minimize the drop in their consumption given a redistribution 
of income toward higher earners. Hence, they borrow from the rich. The effect of these two 
dynamics taken together is an unambiguous increase in the debt-to-income ratio when there is a 
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change in income concentration favoring the rich. This results in an increase risk for financial 
crisis, which occurs when indebted households rationally choose to default.  
 Bengui and Phan (2016) tell a similar story, except they show how inequality leads to 
risky asset bubbles—and hence, the growth in price of assets such as housing. The authors 
develop a two-period, overlapping generations framework in which an agent's utility is a 
function of their consumption in both youth and old age. Agents can borrow and lend from one 
another and hold bubbly assets. Their model shows that as income of the rich increases relative 
to the poor, the price of assets increases, leading to bubbles. As will be discussed in the next 
section, a simplified version of this model will serve as the theoretical basis for my test.  
 In light of these theoretical publications, several authors have sought to test these key 
relationships empirically. Bertrand & Morse (2013) provide evidence for the positive 
relationship between inequality and credit. They do so by testing the relationship between the top 
earners' consumption and those at the bottom, much in the way that Kumhof et al. theorize. Not 
only do they find that they two groups' consumptions are positively correlated, but the middle 
income group's consumption is largely financed by credit—supporting the hypothesis. However, 
Bordo and Meissner (2013) test this relationship more directly—regressing credit growth on 
changes in income inequality—and find no relationship between the two. They build their model 
for credit growth around lagged changes in income inequality—as hypothesized by Kumhof et 
al.—as well as other more traditional macroeconomic variables which previous authors have 
found to be significant in predicting credit growth. One such predictor is current account deficit, 
as found by Mendoza and Terrones (2008). The hypothesized relationship is that the resulting 
inflow of foreign capital results in asset bubbles and an accompanying growth in credit. Another 
possible predictor Bordo and Meissner consider is economic growth, the rationale being that in 
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periods of strong growth the mechanism which rein in credit growth are mitigated due to agents' 
optimism. Other predictors they consider include changes in the real interest rate and M2 money 
aggregate. Additionally, the authors consider a inequality and economic growth interaction term, 
with the rationale being that perhaps the effect of inequality on financial markets varies given the 
current economic condition—namely recession or expansion. For instance, perhaps the growing 
income inequality and economic growth of the mid-2000's had synergistic effects in creating the 
housing bubble. Bordo and Meissner find that changes in inequality and its accompanying 
interaction with GDP growth are not significant predictors for credit growth, while economic 
growth and changes in the real interest are.  
 Meanwhile Jorda et al. (2015) find evidence of the connection between asset bubbles and 
credit growth, as hypothesized by Rajan. They empirically show that the two often occur 
together and that, when they do, the result is generally a long, severe recession. The authors 
supplement this research with an additional paper published at the end of 2016, which shows that 
mortgages are increasing portion of financial institutions balance sheets—roughly doubling over 
the course of the 20th century. The key narrative is that housing and credit and inextricably 
linked in the current macroeconomy.   
 Interestingly, there are no papers—at least to the knowledge of this author—which seeks 
to empirically explore the relationship between inequality and asset prices such as housing. 
Though I will model both credit growth and changes in housing prices on inequality, the key 
contribution will be the discovery of the relationship—or lack thereof—between inequality and 
housing prices. However, past research has sought other means to explain movements in asset 
prices. For example, Bordo & Landon-Lane (2013) find that stock price booms are positively 
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associated with housing prices, and Gali (2014) finds that low-interest rates tend to increase 
housing prices as well. 
 In guiding my empirical model and procedure, I rely on two papers: Schularick and 
Taylor (2012) and Kirschenmann et al. (2014). These papers use country-level fixed effects 
panel logit regression models to test the risk of a financial crisis based on several key 
macroeconomic variables. Though my dependent variables and estimation method are different 
than the aforementioned papers, their methodology and econometric procedure in working with 
the same dataset provide a useful starting point. 
 This dataset includes government debt, aggregate bank loans, M2 money supply, and so 
forth. To that end, they use essentially the same data set, the key difference being that 
Kirschenmann et al. also include data on the share of national income going to the top 1 percent 
of earners. Since I use essentially the same dataset as Kirschenmann et al. in my analysis—the 
only exception being the housing price variable—I will give a more comprehensive overview of 
the variables and the authors means of gathering them later in the Data section.  
 In their tests, Schularick and  Taylor find that credit booms are indeed a significant 
predictor of financial crises. These results hold throughout different time period subsamples, 
with the inclusion of other variables, and in both ordinary least squares regressions and panel 
logit regressions. Furthermore, the authors used a variety of time fixed effects, country fixed 
effects, and robust standard errors to evaluate the robustness of their findings, and again find that 
credit booms and risk of financial crises are significantly and positively related.  
 Building off of those results, Kirschenmann et al. (2014) find that rising income 
inequality along with credit booms compound the risk of a financial crisis. They specify their 
models using panel logit regressions using country fixed effects and robust standard errors. They 
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forego using time fixed effects in order to maintain an adequate amount of observations for their 
models. Lags of changes in equality are positively correlated with the risk of financial crises, 
both on their own and when included with the models specified in Schularick and Taylor 
concerning only credit booms. Additionally, the authors find that inequality has "unilateral" 
predictive power, even when controlling for several other known predictors of financial crisis 
and credit booms, such as current account deficit and value of real stocks. These results 
contradict the findings of Bordo and Meissner, in which the authors found that changes in 
income inequality were not significant in predicting either the risk of financial crisis or credit 
growth. Clarifying this relationship will be another hopeful goal of this paper.  
 
III. Theoretical Model 
 My theoretical model is a simplified version of the one developed by Bengui and Phan. 
Through my construction of a simple utility maximizing equation in which consumption is a 
function of an individual's productivity and savings and lending choices, I show that increased 
inequality in the form of a growing gap between productivity has positive effects on both asset 
prices and credit.  
 I assume there exist two overlapping generations, the young and the old. Each agent is 
endowed with productivity, ω. ω can take two values: ωhigh or ωlow.  For simplicity, I assume that 
the share of the population with ωhigh equals that with ωlow. Each young agent produces according 
to the function: 
y = ωn                                                                                 (1) 
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where y is the value of the product he or she produces, ω is their productivity, and n is their 
supply of labor. For simplicity, I assume each agent inelastically supplies one unit of labor (n = 
1). Thus, the distribution of income for young agents is: 
F(ω) =  ω                                                                               (2) 
where F(ω) can take two possible values: ωhigh or ωlow.  I define those who earn ωhigh  as the rich 
and those who earn ωlow as the poor. The old do not produce, but rather receive a transfer 
payment equal to T.  
 Young agents may borrow and lend to one another, as well as buy bubbly assets. This is 
subject to the debt limit, d̅ ≥ 0. Agents use bubbly assets as a store of value by buying it in their 
youth and then selling it the next period. The price of an asset in time t is given by Bt. For 
simplicity, I assume that bubbles are consistent—abstracting away from the real world risk of 
bubbly assets collapsing in price.  
 Thus, at time t with a given an asset price, Bt, and interest rate, Rt, an agent with 
productivity ω chooses debt position dt and holds bubbly assets, xt, to maximize lifetime utility:  
max
dt(ω),xt(ω)
U (cy,t(ω), co,t+1(ω)) = ln (cy,t(ω)) +  β co,t+1(ω)                          (3) 
where cy,t(ω) is consumption during an agent's youth and cy,t+1(ω) is consumption during an 
agent's old age. I construct xt as the fraction of the total supply of bubbly assets available such 
that for any particular agent, 0 ≤  xt  ≤ 1. The concavity of the utility function with respect to 
cy,t(ω) captures agents' incentive to borrow, lend and save. The linearity of cy,t+1(ω) is 
constructed for simplicity's sake. This is subject to the budget constraints: 
cy,t(ω) = ω +
dt(ω)
Rt
− Btxt(ω)                                                     (4) 
co,t+1(ω) = T − dt(ω) +  Bt+1xt(ω)                                                 (5) 
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where 0 ≤  xt(ω) and 𝑑𝑡(ω) ≤  d̅ 
 I assume that all markets clear. To begin, if 𝑑𝑡
𝑟 = 𝑑𝑡(ω
high) is the amount the rich lend 
and the 𝑑𝑡
𝑝 = 𝑑𝑡(ω
low) is the amount the poor borrow, then 
𝑑𝑡
𝑟 +  𝑑𝑡
𝑝 = 0                                                                   (6) 
that is, the credit market clears. I further assume that this constraint is binding, so that in 
equilibrium 𝑑𝑡
𝑟 =  −d̅ and 𝑑𝑡
𝑝 =  d̅. Similarly, 
∫ cy,t(ω)  +  co,t(ω) ]𝑑𝐹(ω) = ∫ ω𝐹(ω) + T                                          (7) 
that is, the amount of consumption in the economy at time t is equal to its income. And lastly,  
 ∫ 𝑥𝑡(ω)𝑑𝐹(ω) = 1                                                                (8) 
that is, the demand for bubbly assets equals the supply. I assume that in equilibrium that in 
equilibrium the rich lend and hold bubbly assets, while the poor borrow and do not hold any 
assets. Simply put then, xt(ω
high) = 1.   
 This model produces the chief implication that: 
Proposition 1: An increase in the concentration of income among the rich—that is, an increase 
in ωhigh—is associated with an increase in the price of assets, B, as well as credit growth.  
 As a short proof, it can be shown that for a rich agent: 
𝑈′(𝑐𝑦,𝑡(𝜔
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ)) =  𝛽
𝐵𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡
                                                          (9) 
which implies, according to the derivative of the utility function with respect to youth 
consumption, that: 
𝐵𝑡 = 𝜔
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ −  ?̅? −  
1
𝛽
                                                          (10) 
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Thus, asset prices increase with inequality. Though credit and inequality does not factor directly, 
I rely on the related literature which shows the close relationship between housing and lending to 
extend my model to credit growth. (A more detailed proof of Equation 10 can be found in 
Appendix B.). This positive relationship between asset prices and inequality will be the key 
relationship I test for in my empirical model.  
 It should be briefly noted a simple rearranging of the terms in Equation (10) implies that 
income inequality is also a function of asset prices. This reverse causality makes intuitive sense 
as well, as one expect the capital gains from investing in financial markets in the real world to 
not be proportionally distributed across earners, but rather concentrated among the highest 
earners who use those assets as a means of storing wealth. Such reverse causality needs 
represents a problem from an empirical testing standpoint and will be addressed in the coming 
sections. 
 
IV. Empirical Model 
 Following from the theoretical model presented above, I build to an empirical framework. 
The theoretical model shows that relative changes in the endowments for the rich and poor—
income inequality—lead to changes in the size of the credit market and the price of risky assets. 
Accordingly, I use a first difference ordinary linear regression model which seeks to explain 
changes in the lending and housing prices on lagged changes in inequality. The reasons for using 
lagged changes in inequality are threefold. First, as indicated in my theoretical model as well as 
in the related literature, the full effect of a change in inequality should develop overtime—that is, 
a change in inequality in one year will not fully impact financial markets until some point in 
future. This makes sense intuitively, since we should not expect investors and speculators to 
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react to such a macroeconomic shock instantaneously. Second, considering lagged values of 
independent variables reduces the effects of simultaneity one should expect among such 
macroeconomic variables as inequality, housing prices, and credit growth. Along a similar train 
of thought, this accounts in part for the reverse causality apparent in my theoretical model. And 
third, considering lagged of changes in income inequality allows for a more useful comparison to 
the related literature, in which the vast of similarly-focused empirical studies use lags. 
 I also include country fixed effects to account for enduring, country-specific 
heterogeneity across observations. As noted by Kirschenmann et al., this further implies that the 
coefficient estimates for credit growth and asset price change predictors are derived from their 
within-country variations, minimizing the impact of any potential biases due to differences in 
data reporting schemes or standards across countries. Furthermore, I include yearly fixed effects 
to control for period-specific trends in the global economy, such as the Great Depression. Since 
other macroeconomic variables—including the growth in real GDP, change in the value of 
stocks, change in the short-term interest rate, and percent change in the current account deficit—
have been found to be significant in predicting credit growth and change in housing prices, I 
include a vector of other possible predictors to serve as a robustness check in estimating the 
effect of inequality changes on credit growth. Lastly, I include a vector to represent interactions 
term for change in inequality and growth in real GDP.  
 Thus, the preliminary model is as follows: 
%𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑃
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑃+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑃+2𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡         (11) 
where 𝑌 is the dependent variable vector. For the first set of empirical tests, which will be 
explained further in the Empirical Procedure section, first Y is the percentage change in the value 
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of real bank loans in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (credit growth). In the second set of tests, Y is the 
percent change in real housing prices. (𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗) is lagged change in my measure of 
inequality in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡 − 𝑗 (change in inequality). As will be explained further, I 
consider some models contemporaneously depending on the estimation method in order to 
determine confidence in my specified model. 𝑢𝑖 is the set of country fixed effects included in the 
linear models, 𝛿𝑡 is the set of time period indicator dummies, 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 is the vector of control 
variable I include as a robustness check. These are growth in real GDP, change in the value of 
stocks, change in the short-term interest rate, and percent change in the current account deficit. 
To further analyze the effect of these predictors, it will be useful to consider an interaction term 
between lagged income inequality and lagged growth in real GDP per capita. As mentioned 
previously, one consideration in Bordo and Meissner is that perhaps the effect of inequality on 
credit growth differs depending on whether or not the economy is in recession or expansion. If 
such an interaction term were positive, then the effect of inequality is augmented in credit booms 
is augmented during economic expansions. 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 is this interaction term. 𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
 By using a first differences model, I largely eliminate deterministic trends in the data, and 
so I assume each 𝑖𝑡 is normally distributed with mean zero. Furthermore, to account for 
autocorrelation within panels and cross-sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity across panel, 
I run tests in which I estimate my equation using generalized least squares models. I perform my 
estimates using robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity—that is, any changes in 
the variability of 𝑖𝑡 across time and countries.  
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V. Data 
V.1. The Dataset 
 As stated previously, most of the dataset I am using was compiled by Oscar Jorda, Moritz 
Schularick, and Alan Taylor, and is pulled from their "Macrohistory" website. For my inequality 
metric, I use the share of income going to the Top 1 percent of households, as used in 
Kirschenmann et al.  
 The Jorda, Moritz, Schularick dataset contains panel data across 14 countries between the 
years 1870 and 2008. The countries included are: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.  
 The first key variable in this dataset is the aggregate value of bank loans, which 
Schularick and Taylor defined as, "the end-of-year amount of outstanding domestic currency 
lending by domestic banks to domestic households and nonfinancial corporations (excluding 
lending within the financial system)." Schularick and Taylor gather these observations 
themselves for each country, applying the most consistent standard possible across countries in 
including or excluding a financial institution as a "bank." Lending from informal institutions is 
not counted in this variable, both from the lack of accompanying data and the irregularities in 
defining such lending across countries. They note that any country-specific irregularities that 
could appear in these observations, as well as the effect of leaving out informal lending, are 
largely eliminated by applying county fixed effects. 
 The second key variable is a housing price index, normalized and with base 100 set in 
year 1990. This variable was constructed through extensive research, explained more fully in 
Knoll, Schularick, and Steger. 
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 The distinguishing variable in the Kirschenmann et al. dataset is the share of national 
income going to the top 1 percent of households. The authors borrow this data from the World 
Wealth and Income Database (WWID), an ongoing project compiling time series data across 
countries on income and wealth distributions. These observations the same years and countries as 
the Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor data set and make working with the latter dataset fairly easy. 
 There are a variety of reasons I use the share of income going toward the very richest 
households as my metric of inequality, as opposed to a more traditional inequality index. Though 
synthetic indices, such as Gini or Theil coefficients, of inequality may provide a more 
comprehensive view of inequality for the population as a whole, the author note that WWID 
income data has several key advantages. First, is that the researchers at WWID apply a consistent 
methodology across countries in calculating the top income shares overtime, hence measurement 
errors in the inequality metric should be consistent across countries. Calculations of the synthetic 
indices rely on country-reported data and, sometimes, on differing methodologies, making it hard 
to guarantee consistent measurements across countries. The authors further note that the amount 
of data points afforded to them by using the income share of the top 1 percent of earners makes 
the variable much more attractive to use in empirical analysis than other metrics of inequality. 
Both of these indices have limited observations for even developed nations in our period of 
interest. And though these empirical justifications are useful, most important is the fact that a 
metric for the concentration of income better fits the story of my theoretical model. The 
dynamics of the theoretical model concern changes to the incomes of top earners—not 
necessarily the income of all earners. Hence, traditional inequality metrics abstract away from 
my theoretical model and make analysis of the empirical results less intuitive.  
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 The Jorda, Moritz, Schularick dataset also includes other macroeconomic variables to use 
as control variables, per the related literature described in the last section. These include real and 
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, government debt, the short-term nominal 
interest rate on government securities, the consumer price index (CPI) with base year as 1990, 
the current account deficit as a percentage of real GDP, and indices of real stock market value 
compiled from Global Financial Data.  
V.2. Transformations of Key Variables 
 Since I am estimating using a first differences model, I take first differences or the 
percent change over a one-year period for each of the key variables, depending on which is more 
applicable.  
 For value of bank loans, housing price index, GDP per capita, and stock value, I deflate 
them into real terms by using the CPI. Next, I take the first differences in their logs to derive the 
percent change. These transformed variables are what I use in my analysis. 
 I perform a similar procedure for my other key variables—the share of income to top 1 
percent of households, the short-term real interest rate, and the current account deficit as a 
percent of GDP—but simply take the first differences. Deflating using the CPI is not applicable 
in these transformations. 
V.3. Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 gives summary statistics for key variables percent change in lending, percent 
change in real housing prices, change in income for top 1 percent of households, percent change 
in real GDP per capita, change in real short-term interest rate, percent change in real stock value, 
and change in current account deficit as a percent of GDP. The table is divided into three parts: 
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the sample before 1945, after 1945, and the full sample, which provides a convenient means to 
see changes in the data over time.  
 Most readily apparent is how the number of observations grows from the Before 1945 
sample to After 1945. For most variables, the change is subtle. However, for my key independent 
variable, the change is much pronounced—179 observations before 1945 versus 674 afterward—
demonstrating most clearly the bulging nature of the data. 
 It is also important to note how the characteristic of most variables differ between the two 
subsamples. For instance, the mean value for the percent change in real stock value climbs from 
0.014 to 0.065. Similarly, the standard deviation for change in short-term real interest rate in the 
pre-1945 sample is 0.061, where as it is only 0.025 in post-1945 subsample. Though such 
changes make sense and indicate readily-explainable changes to the structure of the global 
macroeconomy, they also represent an issue in how confident I can be in my estimations. To 
account for such wide swings in the behavior of the data, I take time fixed effects and run tests 
over smaller time period subsamples as a robustness check.  
 Table 2 and Table 3 report the estimation samples for credit growth and percent change 
in real housing price index, respectively. Both tables have three parts: pre-1945 subsample, post-
1945 subsample, and full estimation sample. The estimation samples reveal how skewed data is, 
with roughly 500 of the over 600 observations in each estimation sample coming from the post-
1945 subsample. Additionally, the issues with changing variable behavior over time appear to be 
made even more pronounced. As described previously, I have several strategies to deal with 
these issues empirically. 
 Tables 2 and 3 also reveal that the data is essentially the same in both estimation samples. 
Note that the mean and standard deviations for each of the variables present are essentially the 
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same in both tables. This allows me to have confidence in my interpretation of the regression 
results, knowing that each set of tests for the specific dependent variable will be over essentially 
the same observations. 
V.4. Benefits and Limitations of the Data 
 The advantages of using the Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor dataset is that it provides many 
data points across many countries and years. As shown in Tables 2 and 3, my estimation samples 
are quite large—with at least 500 observations in every test. Secondly, the dataset has been 
widely used by other economists in their research. Using the dataset myself allows to look to 
other papers as a benchmark for my tests and to which I can compare and contrast my results to 
help determine their validity.   
 However, there are also several key limitations with the dataset. As made abundantly 
clear in the summary statistics tables, the data tends to bulge over time, with more recent years 
carrying more data points. The downside of this is that outlier observations—such as those from 
the 1800's—are highly leveraged, and can skew the results of my analysis. I account for this 
somewhat in my tests by using time fixed effects. As a further robustness check, I take time 
period subsamples—running tests for data before 1945 and after—to see how the results change.  
 The second issue is that there are many missing data points, especially for income 
inequality. Not only does this temper the estimation sample, it means that some countries may 
have more weight in the regression results simply by having fewer missed observations. I 
account for this somewhat with country fixed-effects, but beyond that there is no other way to 
address this issue. 
 In the same vein as Kirschenmann et al. and Schularick and Taylor, there are two 
additional minor  limitations with the data for which I account for. The first will be to drop the 
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major war periods, namely 1914-1919 and 1939-1947. Dropping these extraordinary time 
periods has the duel benefit of making my analysis more representative of the prevailing story 
and for allowing me to compare my analysis with related papers. The second will be to drop 
bank loan data from France between 1870 and 1889 due to it being—as Schularick and Taylor 
describe—"noisy," with again the benefits being intuitive analysis of results  and ability to 
compare my results to other papers.  
 
VI. Empirical Results 
 Recall that the empirical model is as follows: 
%𝛥𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑗(𝛥𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗)
𝑃
𝑗=1
+ 𝛽𝑃+1𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑃+2𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝑢𝑖 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡         (11) 
The first step is to establish is confidence in my specified model. My goal is to consider up to 
several lags of income inequality in predicting changes in credit and housing prices using an 
ordinary least squares model with time and country fixed effects. However, given an unbalanced 
panel data set that bulges overtime, I need further confidence that the results given a particular 
estimation method are robust.  
 I do this by comparing estimated coefficient for predictors across several estimation 
methods—some of which can only be modeled using contemporaneous variables. Accordingly, 
for my first set of tests I do not include any lags. As a baseline, I first consider an ordinary least 
squares model with time-fixed effects. I build on this first model by including, first, country 
random effects, and then county fixed effects. The fourth estimation model attempts to account 
for my unbalanced panel dataset and autocorrelated disturbances. The fifth and sixth 
specifications consider a possible heteroskedastic error structure  and autocorrelation within 
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panels—with the fifth model considering a common autocorrelation and the sixth considering 
country-specific autocorrelation. Lastly, I use a generalized method of moments estimator to 
account for correlation between the dependent variable and its lags. If the estimated coefficients 
for my predictors are consistent, I can have confidence in my fixed effects model with lags. 
Since I am considering two dependent variables, I run these tests twice—one in which the 
dependent variable is credit growth, and the other in which it is changes in real housing prices.  
 Table 4 reports the estimates for predicting credit growth on the contemporaneous 
changes in income inequality as well as several control variables, per the methodology described 
above. The coefficients for every variable are relatively consistent across each estimation 
method, and their significance essentially the same throughout. The coefficient for change in 
income inequality varies between 0.003 and 0.009, with this number being slightly significantly 
different from zero in just two of the seven specifications. The control variables—real GDP 
growth, change in real stock value, change in short-term real interest rate, and change in current 
account deficit—display similar consistency. The magnitude of a variable varies by only a few 
thousandths, and its significance is unchanged save for a few models. The only noteworthy 
exceptions are the significance of the change of real stock value—which is highly significant in 
every model except the OLS methods using country random fixed and country fixed effects—
and the change in current account deficit, which is significant in every model except in the GMM 
model. With the key independent variable displaying a consistent estimated coefficient across 
models and the control variables, for the most part, duplicating this behavior, I conclude the OLS 
specification of my model with time and country fixed effects is reasonable and have confidence 
in predicting credit growth using lags of changes in income inequality.  
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 Next, I repeat the tests described above but with changes in real housing prices as the 
dependent variable. Table 5 reports the results for estimating this variable using 
contemporaneous predictors across several specifications. These results are slightly more 
nuanced than the results in predicting credit growth, but my model appears to still be correctly 
specified in that the same relationship between inequality and housing prices appears to unfold 
across the battery of estimation methods. For instance, the coefficient for a contemporaneous 
change in income inequality varies from -0.006 to 0.000, and is insignificant in each of the seven 
estimation methods. This coefficient has a much higher magnitude in the OLS methods than it is 
in the GLS or GMM methods, where it is essentially zero. Similarly, coefficients for the control 
variables are essentially the same in the OLS methods before shifting in the GLS and GMM 
methods. Though these represent a possible issue in my ability to model my specification using 
OLS and lags, the fact that the significance of these coefficients is—with just one exception—the 
same throughout indicates that, though the exact effect of income inequality on housing prices 
may differ depending on the estimation method, the same story is being told in each one. The 
single exception is the significance of the change in real stock value, which goes from 
insignificant in the OLS methods to highly significant in the GLS and GMM models. I conclude 
that estimating using an OLS model with time and country fixed effects in order to consider lags 
is reasonable.   
 Given this confidence, the next step is to determine the appropriate number of lags for 
change in income inequality. I do so following the methodology used in Kirschenmann et al. 
First, the authors assume at most six lags. If the coefficient for the sixth lag is not statistically 
significant, then they remove that lag and test with five lags. They repeat this process until the 
coefficient of the largest lagged variable is significant. I do this test for both models predicting 
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both credit growth and changes in real housing prices and do not assume that the optimal number 
of lags is the same for both. To account for invariant, cross-country heterogeneity and structural 
changes to the world macroeconomy over time, my model models consider both country and 
year fixed effects.  
 Table 6 reports the regression results for predicting credit growth on lags income 
inequality and control variables. In completing the Kirschenmann et al optimal lag methodology 
as described previously, I find that there is no optimal number of lags for income inequality 
when assuming at most six lags are feasible. Not only was no combination of lags optimal, but 
no lag in any test was significant. In the name of completeness, I adjust the methodology and 
assume up to 10 lags of income inequality could be optimal and find the same result. The fact 
that no lags between one and 10 were significant strongly suggest that changes in income 
inequality and credit growth are unrelated, which do not support the first half of my hypothesis 
relating credit growth and income inequality.  
 Regardless, for the sake of presentation, Table 6 models credit growth on four lags of 
income inequality, along with my specified control variables as previously discussed in my 
empirical model section. Additionally, using four lags will provide a useful comparison to results 
estimating changes in real housing prices on lagged income inequality, about which more will be 
discussed shortly. Column (1) is the basic model, as described by Equation (11). Column (2) 
adds a GDP-inequality interaction term, which allows us to see how macroeconomic conditions 
effect the relationship between income inequality and financial markets. Namely, whether the 
economy is in recession or expansion has any significance on my empirical tests. Column (3) 
estimates the same model as Column (2), but considers only observations coming from the post-
195 subsample as a robustness check. As alluded to earlier, the dataset tends to bulge overtime in 
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that there are drastically more data points for variables such as the top 1 percent's share of 
income and the short-term real interest rate. Additionally, the characteristics of these variables, 
including their means and standard deviations, are significantly different between the period 
before 1945 and the period after 1945. Hence, the results of my model estimated using post-1945 
subsample helps determine what effect, if any, this disparity in the distribution of data points has 
on my model. Not only does account for bulging, it also is useful to track possible structural 
changes in the global economy and to see how these macroeconomic variables behave in a more 
current era.  
 As seen in Table 6, the coefficients for the inequality lags are nearly zero and at no 
reasonable level of confidence are they significant, meaning that credit growth and inequality 
have no apparent association. Meanwhile, the control variables have vastly more predictive 
power, with lagged real GDP growth, change in interest rate, and change in current account 
deficit being highly significant. This confirms much of what the related literature has found, in 
which positive changes in GDP growth, the current account deficit, and interest rates are 
associated with delayed changes in credit growth. However, contrary to some of the other related 
literature, the value of real stock and credit growth do not appear to be associated with one 
another, as the accompanying coefficient for the change in the real stock value is near zero in 
Columns (1), (2), and (3). The interaction term between real GDP growth and income inequality, 
as seen in Column (2), is not significant. This suggests that the effect of inequality on credit 
growth is the same, no matter if the economy is growing or receding.  
 The post-1945 time period subsample tells essentially the same story. Though the 
magnitude of the coefficients change some in the subsample, the significance predictors are 
essentially the same in Column (3) and they are in Columns (1) or (2). In particular, lagged 
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income inequality remains insignificant in predicting credit growth—whether estimating the full 
sample or the post-1945 subsample.   
 In short, lagged changes of income inequality are not associated with credit growth. This 
result is consistent across several considered lag values, as well as with and without an 
interaction term with GDP growth. These results do not support the first part my hypothesis 
relating income inequality and credit growth.  
 Table 7 reports the results of the same tests estimating the change in real housing prices 
on lagged changes in income inequality. As it was before, three models are estimated: Column 
(1) models lagged income inequality and control variables, Column (2) adds the GDP-inequality 
interaction term, and Column (3) considers the post-1945 subsample as a robustness check. 
Using the Kirschenmann et al. methodology, I determine that the optimal number of lags is four. 
Accordingly, it can be seen in Columns (1) and Column (2) that the fourth lag of the change in 
income inequality is significant in predicting changes in real housing prices, with a one percent 
increase in the Top 1% of household's share of income leading to, approximately, a 0.02 percent 
increase in housing prices. Lags one through three of income inequality are insignificant, 
meaning they are not associated with housing prices. Real GDP growth and percent change in the 
value of real stocks are significant, while interestingly changes in the interest rate, current 
account deficit, and the GDP-inequality interaction term are not. The fact that the significance of 
the control variables differs so widely in the credit growth tests versus the change in housing 
prices tests indicates is another indication that the two are not strongly linked as hypothesized. 
Regardless, the significance of income inequality in predicting changes in housing prices 
validates, at least in part, my hypothesis.  
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 These results are only strengthened by the robustness check conducted in Column (3), in 
which I estimate over only the post-1945 subsample. Using these more recent data points, both 
the second and fourth lags of changes in income inequality are significant. In particular, a one 
percent increase in the Top 1% of household's share of income is associated with a 0.01 percent 
increase in housing prices two years later, and a 0.02 percent increase four year later. The 
significance of the control variables remain generally unchanged. The only exception is the 
GDP-inequality interaction term, which becomes significant and positive in the post-1945 
subsample. This implies that, in the current era, that economic growth exacerbates effect of 
growing income inequality on housing prices. 
 As a final robustness check, I model credit growth and changes in real housing prices on 
lagged changes in income inequality and other control variables simultaneously over the same 
estimation sample. Doing so ensures adds clarity to how the independent relationships between 
inequality and credit and inequality and housing prices play out over the same years of 
observations. This in turn, allows me to interpret how inequality impacts financial markets in 
general, which is the goal of my theoretical model and paper.  
 In keeping with previous tests, I estimate this model using four lags of income inequality. 
Table 8 reports these results. Over the same estimation sample, the effect of income inequality 
on housing prices and credit growth are the same as when modeled separately. None of the four 
lags of income inequality are significant in predicting credit growth, with each coefficient being 
essentially zero. Meanwhile, in predicting changes in housing prices, the fourth lag of income 
inequality is significant and has the same magnitude as previously found, 0.020. The significance 
of the control variables differ depending on the dependent variable. These results reaffirm that 
changes in housing prices and credit growth as a function of income inequality appear to be 
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unrelated. As to why this is the case is not immediately clear. However, more about this will be 
discussed in the Conclusion section. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
  Using a first-differences OLS model with year and country fixed effects, I find that lags 
of income inequality—in the form of an increased concentration of national income among the 
top 1 percent of households, is significant in predicting increasing in real housing prices, but not 
significant in predicting credit booms. In particular, a one percent increase in the top 1 percent 
households' income is associated with a 0.02 percent increase in housing prices four years later. 
This result accounts for the impact of other factors—such as real GDP growth, changes in the 
real short-term interest rate, changes in stocks' real value, and changes in the current account 
deficit—as specified by the related literature as significant in moving asset prices, credit, or both. 
Additionally, the result is robust over time period subsamples, remaining consistent in 
significance and magnitude. In fact, an additional lag of income inequality becomes significant 
in predicting housing price changes when looking at post-1945 observations—in particular, 
changes in income of the Top 1% are associated with changes in housing price two years later. 
Meanwhile, the impact of lagged income inequality on credit growth is close zero and 
insignificant across specifications. I have confidence in my OLS estimations based on the 
consistency of my empirical model across estimation methods when modeled 
contemporaneously. However, my results are limited in that reverse causality is may still exist in 
my finding. I account for them in part by using only lagged values for independent variables in 
my key tests, but the feedback loop between asset prices and inequality would overstate the 
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significance of my results. Though my results are encouraging in that they are robust over a 
battery of checks, more advanced testing is needed to confirm their significance.  
 The results confirm, in part, my hypothesis and theoretical model which sought to explain 
movements in housing prices and credit through changes in income inequality. My model is 
successful in predicting increases in housing prices as a result of growing income inequality. 
This confirms the intuition that the rich use housing and other bubbly assets as a store of wealth, 
and that an increasingly top heavy income distribution will fuel asset price booms. This result 
adds to a growing body of work seeking to explain housing price movements in the context of 
risky asset bubbles and their impact on macroeconomic health. The model fails in that the link 
between credit and housing appears to be not as direct as thought by myself and others. Indeed, 
the results of simultaneous test indicate that very different mechanisms must be at play between 
credit and asset prices, as the estimation results for income inequality on credit growth and 
changes in real housing prices remain persistent. The exact story unfolding in the data remains, 
at least in part, hidden, making it hard to describe the exact mechanisms at play. 
 These findings open the door to explore some very interesting questions. If credit and 
housing prices are not inextricably linked as hypothesized by myself and others, than why do 
they play a concurrent role in financial crises, as found by Jorda et al. (2015)? If income 
inequality can drive housing bubbles but not credit booms, then what other factor is at play? And 
as for my results in particular, it is interesting to explore why the only the fourth lag is robust. 
What is the mechanism that delays income inequality's impact by four years on housing prices? 
And, of course income inequality is itself likely a symptom of some other macroeconomic 
phenomenon—is my result just another link in a long, hidden chain of mechanisms? These 
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questions and others like them will surely be answered as economists seek a deeper 
understanding of the macroeconomy.   
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Appendix A – Tables 
1. Summary Statistics 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for key variables over the full sample. Data divided into two time 
period subsamples (before and after 1945). 
Before 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 665 0.041 0.094 -0.426 0.683 
%Δreal housing price index 543 0.011 0.085 -0.350 0.373 
Δ Top 1%'s income 179 -0.091 1.033 -5.960 3.200 
%Δ real GDP per capita 868 0.015 0.045 -0.261 0.162 
Δ real short-term interest rate  664 0.000 0.061 -0.306 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 795 0.014 0.172 -0.796 0.980 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 761 0.000 0.029 -0.246 0.204 
    
   
  
After 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 832 0.065 0.072 -0.167 0.601 
%Δreal housing price index 783 0.026 0.083 -0.382 0.076 
Δ Top 1%'s income 674 0.013 0.606 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 854 0.027 0.025 -0.067 0.167 
Δ real short-term interest rate  682 0.000 0.025 -0.139 0.136 
%Δ real stock value 1122 0.065 0.221 -2.223 0.999 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 787 0.001 0.021 -0.186 0.203 
    
   
  
Total N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 1497 0.054 0.083 -0.426 0.683 
%Δreal housing price index 1326 0.020 0.084 -0.382 0.756 
Δ Top 1%'s income 853 -0.008 0.717 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 1722 0.021 0.037 -0.261 0.167 
Δ real short-term interest rate  1346 0.000 0.046 -0.306 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 1917 0.044 0.203 -2.223 0.999 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 1548 0.001 0.025 -0.246 0.204 
Notes: N is observations. S.D. is standard deviation. Min is the minimum value that a variable takes 
in the current sample. Max is the maximum value that a variable takes in the current sample. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for key variables for the estimation sample for credit growth 
analysis. Data divided into two time period subsamples (before and after 1945). 
Before 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 132 0.025 0.095 -0.320 0.341 
Δ Top 1%'s income 132 -0.017 0.827 -2.000 2.150 
%Δ real GDP per capita 132 0.013 0.049 -0.148 0.162 
Δ real short-term interest rate  132 0.001 0.078 -0.203 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 132 0.003 0.227 -0.796 0.452 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 132 0.001 0.032 -0.010 0.147 
    
   
  
After 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 510 0.061 0.685 -0.157 0.392 
Δ Top 1%'s income 510 0.043 0.617 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 510 0.024 0.022 -0.043 0.114 
Δ real short-term interest rate  510 0.001 0.025 -0.139 0.135 
%Δ real stock value 510 0.078 0.199 -0.898 0.860 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 510 0.001 0.016 -0.118 0.094 
    
   
  
Total N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δreal bank loans 642 0.054 0.076 -0.320 0.392 
Δ Top 1%'s income 642 0.031 0.665 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 642 0.022 0.030 -0.148 0.162 
Δ real short-term interest rate  642 0.001 0.042 -0.203 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 642 0.062 0.207 -0.798 0.860 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 642 0.001 0.020 -0.118 0.146 
Notes: N is observations. S.D. is standard deviation. Min is the minimum value that a variable takes 
in the current sample. Max is the maximum value that a variable takes in the current sample. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for key variables for the estimation sample for change in housing 
price analysis. Data divided into two time period subsamples (before and after 1945). 
Before 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δ real housing price index 103 0.002 0.098 -0.299 0.279 
Δ Top 1%'s income 103 -0.028 0.802 -2.000 2.140 
%Δ real GDP per capita 103 0.011 0.047 -0.148 0.126 
Δ real short-term interest rate  103 0.003 0.081 -0.203 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 103 0.002 0.205 -0.796 0.452 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 103 0.002 0.031 -0.010 0.146 
    
   
  
After 1945 N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δ real housing price index 511 0.028 0.076 -0.382 0.272 
Δ Top 1%'s income 511 0.044 0.616 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 511 0.024 0.022 -0.043 0.115 
Δ real short-term interest rate  511 0.001 0.025 -0.139 0.136 
%Δ real stock value 511 0.078 0.199 -0.798 0.860 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 511 0.001 0.016 -0.118 0.094 
    
   
  
Total N Mean S.D. Min Max 
%Δ real housing price index 614 0.024 0.081 -0.382 0.279 
Δ Top 1%'s income 614 0.032 0.651 -8.740 4.960 
%Δ real GDP per capita 614 0.022 0.028 -0.148 0.126 
Δ real short-term interest rate  614 0.001 0.040 -0.203 0.366 
%Δ real stock value 614 0.065 0.202 -0.798 0.860 
Δ Current Account Deficit (% of GDP) 614 0.001 0.019 -0.118 0.146 
Notes: N is observations. S.D. is standard deviation. Min is the minimum value that a variable takes 
in the current sample. Max is the maximum value that a variable takes in the current sample. 
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Table 6: Modeling credit growth on 
lagged changes in income inequality + 
other control variables. Post-1945 
subsample modeled in Column 3. 









ΔL1. Top 1%'s income 0.002 -0.001 -0.019 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.019) 
ΔL2. Top 1%'s income 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
ΔL3. Top 1%'s income -0.003 -0.004 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
ΔL4. Top 1%'s income 0.000 0.000 -0.003 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
%ΔL1. real GDP per capita 0.740*** 0.726*** 1.014*** 
  (0.105) (0.102) (0.178) 
ΔL1. real short-term interest rate  0.369*** 0.362*** -0.028 
  (0.078) (0.080) (0.087) 
%ΔL1. real stock value 0.007 0.009 0.013 
  (0.027) (0.026) (0.031) 
ΔL1. Current Account Deficit (% of 
GDP) 
0.319*** 0.316*** 0.273 
(0.098) (0.102) (0.184) 
%Δ L1.Top 1% * L1.%Δ real GDP   0.146 0.936 
    (0.209) (1.038) 
N 595 595 482 
R-squared 0.407 0.408 0.371 
Adjusted R-squared 0.392 0.392 0.351 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual percent change in real bank loans. Δ denotes annual 
difference. Estimation is by OLS. Coefficients reported in first row and standard errors 
reported below in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence; ** at 95% 
confidence, and * at 90% confidence. Time fixed-effects, country fixed-effects, and robust 
standard errors used in both models. Models specifying up to six lags of income inequality 
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Table 7: Modeling changes in real 
housing prices on lagged changes in 
income inequality + other control 
variables. Post-1945 subsample modeled 
in Column 3. 









ΔL1. Top 1%'s income -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 
  (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) 
ΔL2. Top 1%'s income 0.002 0.002 0.010* 
  (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
ΔL3. Top 1%'s income -0.004 -0.005 0.006 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) 
ΔL4. Top 1%'s income 0.020* 0.019* 0.019** 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) 
%ΔL1. real GDP per capita 0.891** 0.903*** 1.357*** 
  (0.030) (0.283) (0.269) 
ΔL1. real short-term interest rate  -0.020 -0.035 -0.233 
  (0.165) (0.168) (0.207) 
%ΔL1. real stock value 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.057*** 
  (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) 
ΔL1. Current Account Deficit (% of 
GDP) 
-0.137 -0.125 -0.098 
(0.146) (0.149) (0.138) 
%Δ L1.Top 1% * L1.%Δ real GDP   0.317 0.586* 
    (0.383) (0.300) 
N 568 568 482 
R-squared 0.364 0.368 0.407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.349 0.353 0.390 
Notes: Dependent variable is the annual percent change in real housing prices. Δ denotes 
annual difference. Estimation is by OLS. Coefficients reported in first row and standard errors 
reported below in parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence; ** at 95% 
confidence, and * at 90% confidence. Time fixed-effects, country fixed-effects, and robust 
standard errors used in both models. Models specifying up to six lags of income inequality 
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Table 8: Simultaneously modeling credit 
growth and changes in real housing 
prices on lagged changes in income 







ΔL1. Top 1%'s income -0.001 -0.008 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
ΔL2. Top 1%'s income 0.001 0.002 
  (0.005) (0.005) 
ΔL3. Top 1%'s income -0.004 -0.005 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
ΔL4. Top 1%'s income -0.001 0.019*** 
  (0.006) (0.007) 
%ΔL1. real GDP per capita 0.814*** 0.903*** 
  (0.128) (0.143) 
ΔL1. real short-term interest rate  0.356*** -0.035 
  (0.081) (0.091) 
%ΔL1. real stock value 0.018 0.071*** 
  (0.017) (0.019) 




%Δ L1.Top 1% * L1.%Δ real GDP 0.173 0.317* 
  (0.156) (0.175) 
N 568 
R-squared     
Adjusted R-squared     
Notes: Dependent variable in Column (1) is the annual percent change in real 
bank loans. Dependent variable in Column (2) is the annual percent change in 
real housing prices. Δ denotes annual difference. Estimation is by OLS. 
Coefficients reported in first row and standard errors reported below in 
parenthesis. *** indicates significance at 99% confidence; ** at 95% 
confidence, and * at 90% confidence. Time fixed-effects, country fixed-
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Appendix B – Proof of Theoretical Model 
Proof of Proposition 1 
 From Equations 3, 4, and 5, the first order condition of the utility maximization function 
for an agent with a given productivity ω with respect to 𝑑𝑡(ω) is:  
1
𝑅𝑡
𝑈′ (𝑐𝑦,𝑡(ω)) −  β − μd = 0  
𝑈′ (𝑐𝑦,𝑡(ω)) =  βRt +  μdRt                                                      (12) 
where μ
d
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the credit constraint, 𝑑𝑡(ω) ≤  d̅. Similarly, 
the first order condition with respect to 𝑥𝑡(ω) is: 
−𝐵𝑡𝑈
′ (𝑐𝑦,𝑡(ω)) +  β𝐵𝑡+1 + μx = 0 







                                                     (13) 
where μ
x
 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the short-selling constraint 0 ≤  xt(ω). This 
implies that for every agent: 







=  βRt +  μdRt                                       (14) 




 and are nonbinding 
and must be equal to zero. Equation 14 simplifies to: 
𝑈′ (𝑐𝑦,𝑡(ω
high)) =  β
𝐵𝑡+1
𝐵𝑡
=  βRt                                               (15) 
and so in steady-state Rt = 1. Thus I arrive at: 
U′ (cy,t(ω
high)) =  β                                                          (16) 
With the assumption that rich agents hold all bubbly assets (xt(ω
high) = 1) and that Rt = 1, 
𝑈′ (𝑐𝑦,𝑡(ω
high)) with respect to 𝑑𝑡(ω) for rich agents (agents with productivity ω
high) is simply: 





ωhigh −  ?̅? −  𝐵𝑡
                                             (17) 
which implies, by Equation 16, that: 




 𝐵𝑡 =  ω
high −  ?̅? −
1
β
                                                           (10) 
and so 𝐵𝑡 is increasing with the rich agents' income. That is, an increase in income concentration 
for the top households—and thus an increase in income inequality—leads to an increase in asset 
prices. Through the related literature, I assume that the increase in asset prices is concurrent with 
an increase in credit.  
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Appendix C – Replication 
 All results can be replicated using the data and do files located here:  
https://www.dropbox.com/sh/m6ldbc6v6mwuswv/AADOZZyXXBkNjmoUL_Hi-Uhca?dl=0 
